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Abstract 
Following the 1997 crisis, banking sector reforms in Asia have been characterised by 
the emphasis on prudential regulation, associated with increased financial 
liberalisation. Using a panel data set of commercial banks from eight major Asian 
economies over the period 2001-2010, this study explores how the coexistence of 
liberalisation and prudential regulation affects banks’ cost characteristics. Given the 
presence of heterogeneity of technologies across countries, we use a stochastic 
frontier approach followed by the estimation of a deterministic meta-frontier to 
provide ‘true’ estimates of bank cost efficiency measures. Our results show that the 
liberalisation of bank interest rates and the increase in foreign banks' presence have 
had a positive and significant impact on technological progress and cost efficiency. 
On the other hand, we find that prudential regulation might adversely affect bank cost 
performance. When designing an optimal regulatory framework, policy makers 
should combine policies which aim to foster financial stability without hindering 
financial intermediation.  
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1. Introduction 
The post-crisis reform period in Asia has been characterised by the emphasis on the 
prudential regulation of banks, concomitant with an increased liberalisation of the 
banking systems. More specifically, while large-scale bank restructuring programmes 
and tighter prudential rules were put in place in those countries most affected by the 
1997 crisis (e.g. Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines), other countries, such as 
China, India and Vietnam, saw an acceleration of financial liberalisation over the 
same time period. This process resulted in substantial changes in market structure, 
deriving both from greater foreign presence and from increased privatisation across 
the region.  
There is general consensus in the literature on the benefits of financial liberalisation 
as it fosters competition and promotes economic growth (Cetorelli and Gambera, 
2001; Claessens and Laeven, 2004). Deregulation-induced competition, in turn, can 
translate into incentives for managers to improve efficiency (Leibenstein, 1966). 
However, evidence on the role of prudential regulation on bank efficiency is 
inconclusive. Although prudential regulation is primarily designed to strengthen 
systemic stability and improve the functioning of banking markets, some argue that 
these regulatory policies can have adverse effects on financial intermediation. 
Economic theory suggests that prudential regulatory tools can affect the effectiveness 
of financial intermediation in a number of ways. For instance, stringent capital 
requirements can reduce banks’ borrowing costs because high capitalisation can 
signal lower bankruptcy risk. On the other hand, the imposition of minimum capital 
requirements may impose additional costs on banks. In particular, if banks are 
required to raise equity capital at a price higher than the interest rate on deposits, an 
increase in capital requirements may discourage banks’ willingness to screen 
borrowers and lend (Thakor, 1996, Gorton and Winton, 2000). Recent years have seen 
an increasing interest in the academic literature in evaluating the impact of bank 
prudential regulation on efficiency. The empirical results, however, are rather mixed. 
There is evidence indicating that the current regulatory and supervisory frameworks 
impede the efficient operation of banks (Chortareas et al., 2012). As steps towards 
further regulatory reforms are taking place in many Asian economies, it is important 
for policy makers to ascertain whether the regulatory reforms implemented in the post 
1997 crisis period successfully brought the Asian banking sector into a more 
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competitive, efficient and stable state. An analysis of the Asian market is significant 
given its unique and dynamic regional characteristics. The region comprises well 
developed economies such as Japan and Hong Kong, along with transitional 
economies such as China, India and the South-East Asian economies. In the aftermath 
of the Asian crisis, the process and pace of bank regulatory reforms varied 
substantially from country to country. Such diversification provides us with an 
excellent laboratory within which to understand the impact of regulatory reforms on 
banks’ managerial decisions and bank performance. In addition, the lessons from the 
resolution of the Asian crisis have a strong resonance today, when many economies 
are embarking on the restructuring of their banking sectors in the aftermath of the 
2007-2009 global financial crisis.  
Thus far, the established literature that attempts to identify the potential impact of 
regulatory progress on bank performance has typically focused on either the European 
market (e.g. Chortareas et al., 2012; Delis, et al., 2011), or has been based on publicly 
listed banks (Pasiouras et al., 2009; Haw et al., 2010). Only a paucity of studies has 
addressed the Asian market. This lack of empirical evidence makes the analysis of the 
Asian market particularly important from the perspective of regulatory authorities. 
Moreover, the established literature studying the impact of regulatory environments 
on bank performance often focuses on either deregulatory policies or prudential 
regulations; hardly any literature addresses both aspects simultaneously, nor 
distinguishes the independent impacts of each regulatory tool on bank performance.  
 Against this background, this study explores how the coexistence of liberalisation 
and prudential regulation affected banks’ cost characteristics in eight major Asian 
economies. We build a large panel dataset encompassing depository institutions from 
China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines, 
over the period 2001-2010. Given the presence of heterogeneity of technologies 
across countries, we use a stochastic frontier approach (SFA) followed by the 
estimation of a deterministic meta-frontier to provide ‘true’ estimates of bank cost 
efficiency measures. Bootstrapping techniques are also used to derive test statistics for 
the estimated coefficients of the meta-frontier function.  
Our results show that the liberalisation of bank interest rates and the increase in 
foreign banks presence have a positive and significant impact on technological 
progress and cost efficiency. However, not all liberalisation policies have a positive 
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impact on banks’ cost performance, thus suggesting that the appropriateness of each 
policy should be considered individually. In addition, we find that prudential re-
regulation tends to adversely affect bank cost performance. Policies which aim to 
strengthen prudential regulation (for example increased capital requirements under the 
Basel III capital adequacy accord) should take into account the potential negative 
effects on bank performance, with a view to balance the need to foster stability 
without hindering financial intermediation.  
The rest of this Chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview 
of the banking system development in Asia. Section 3 reviews the theoretical 
literature and empirical findings related to banking regulatory reforms and efficiency. 
Section 4 describes the data and the empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the 
empirical results, and concluding remarks are presented in Section 6. 
 
2.  Banking in Asia: a brief overview 
Banking intermediation plays an important role in economic development in Asia: 
deposits and bank credit to the private sector are fairly high in China, Hong Kong, 
Japan, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam compared to international standards. 
However, banking penetration is still below international standards in India, Indonesia 
and the Philippines, with deposits accounting for less than 50% of GDP; as a 
consequence, the level of loans extended to the private sector is rather low, being only 
a third of GDP.  
The predominant role played by the banking sector in the financial system in Asia is 
apparent, and is primarily due to the under-development of capital and bond markets 
in many countries: for instance, in China, Thailand and Vietnam in the early 2000s the 
size of bank credit to GDP was three times higher than market capitalisation. 
Nonetheless, more recent years saw strong growth in market capitalisation, suggesting 
firms are reducing their reliance on banks.  
Financial deregulation began in some Asian countries in the 1970s and accelerated in 
the 1980s; this is the case for instance of Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and 
the Philippines. Liberal policies usually commenced with interest rates deregulation 
and in some instances moved to the opening of capital accounts to international 
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investors. Table 1 outlines the interest liberalisation process of selected Asian 
economies. As it can be seen, while the majority of Asian economies removed interest 
rate restrictions between the 1970s and the early 1990s. China and India retain 
considerable control to date (especially in terms of deposits). The free capital flows 
and the liberalised interest rate regime, coupled with the weak internal management 
systems and complicated external economic environment, caused devastating 
meltdowns in the banking systems of some Asian economies with the onset of the 
1997 financial crisis.  
 
Table 1 Interest rate deregulation  
Cou
ntry 
Pre-crisis 1998 - 2003 2004 – 2010 
CN Interest rates were strictly 
controlled. 
Allow loan and deposit 
rates to fluctuate 
within a certain range. 
The ceiling on deposit rates 
and the floor on lending 
rates remain heavily 
controlled, but lending rates 
are allowed to float 
downward by 10% over the 
benchmark..   
HK Interest rates on time 
deposit of less than 7 days 
were under control. 
Interest rate 
restrictions were 
totally removed (July 
2001). 
Deregulated. 
IN The ceiling on time 
deposit rates was 
removed. 
  
Interest rate control on 
loans over 200,000 
Rupees was removed. 
Lending rates were 
deregulated; interest rates on 
savings accounts remain 
heavily controlled.   
ID Deregulated (interest rate 
deregulation completed in 
1983). 
Deregulated.  Deregulated. 
JP Deregulated (interest rates 
controls on loans and 
deposits removed in 1973 
and 1994, respectively). 
Deregulated. Deregulated. 
MY Deregulated (interest rates 
were initially deregulated 
between 1971 and 1981. 
Deposit rates were then 
re-controlled by the 
government in 1985 and 
removed again in 1991). 
Deregulated. Deregulated. 
PH Deregulated (in 1983). Deregulated.  Deregulated. 
TH Deregulated (in 1992). Deregulated.  Deregulated. 
VN Deposit rates were Interest ceiling on Deregulated. 
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liberalised in 1996. lending rates was 
removed (in 2002). 
Source: The Central Banks of the selected economies. 
Countries’ names are shortened as follows: CN for China, HK for Hong Kong SAR, JP for Japan, IN 
for India, ID for Indonesia, MY for Malaysia, PH for the Philippines, TH for Thailand, VN for 
Vietnam. These abbreviations apply to the whole Chapter.  
 
During the 1997 financial crisis, a number of banks failed whilst others were 
nationalised, restructured and later re-privatised. Bank restructuring and privatisation 
were motivated by governments' desire to quickly resolve financial sector problems 
and return banks to the private sector. From 1998 to the completion of restructuring 
programmes circa 2001, bank restructuring (in the form of compulsory M&A) 
worked as an exit strategy for weak banks in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Thailand and Japan. Since the early 2000s, M&A activities have become more 
market-driven in the countries most affected by the financial crisis (e.g. Thailand, 
Indonesia, the Philippines and Japan). In countries less affected by the 1997 crisis, 
such as China, Hong Kong, India and Vietnam, structural changes in domestic 
banking sectors were primarily the result of the acceleration of bank liberalisation and 
of reforms in corporate governance. These dynamics in the Asian banking market 
have led to a significant change in market structure, which manifested in the 
increasingly diversified bank ownership (e.g. Indonesia, Thailand) and the efficiency-
driven corporate governance reforms (e.g. China, India and Vietnam).  Figure 1 
illustrates the change of ownership structure before and after the banking restructuring 
programmes. As it can be seen, state involvement in banks is reducing especially in 
countries in which state-ownership was predominant, while foreign and private 
institutions play an increasingly important role in the banking sector.   
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
The change in market structure shows up also in the increasing concentration of 
assets: in the period 1998-2010 the number of banks in Asia decreased considerably 
as a result of market consolidation between small and medium-sized banks. The five-
bank concentration ratio (CR5) 1  however exhibits a mixed trend among Asian 
economies, as depicted in Figure 2. While the market is increasingly concentrated in 
countries in which the banking sector was historically dominated by families or the 
private sector (such as Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia and the Philippines), a gradual 
                                                 
1 CR5 is computed as the total assets share of the 5 largest banks in the system. 
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process of decentralisation takes place instead in those countries formerly dominated 
by state-ownership (such as China, Indonesia, India and Vietnam), as a result of 
privatisation. In terms of the overall trend of market concentration, the Herfindahl–
Hirschman Index (HHI)2  of banks’ assets indicates that banking markets became 
increasingly concentrated in the second half of the decade (from 2006 onward) despite 
a declining trend in the first half of the decade as shown in Figure 2.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
The process of deregulation allowed banks to become bigger; of particular concern for 
policymakers is that higher levels of concentration could adversely impact on the 
competitiveness of domestic banking sectors, if banks collude over the setting of 
interest rates. While Japan, India and Malaysia experienced a slight fall in net interest 
margins (NIM), other countries did not show this declining trend, as shown in Figure 
3. In particular, an increase in NIM is found in Indonesia, Hong Kong and Thailand, 
which implies market competitiveness might not necessarily have intensified.  
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
The increasing trend of NIM may suggest no increase in competitive pressures due to 
increased concentration in some banking markets, especially from 2006 onward. 
Another important element may relate to the shift in regulatory focus from bank 
deregulation to bank re-regulation. Bank re-regulation was implemented post-1997 in 
an attempt to reduce the risks associated with financial deregulation, and the process 
gained increasing attention in recent years due to the adoption of international 
banking practices (i.e. the Basel Accords). Under the new regulatory regime, 
increasing emphasis has been given to improving bank capital adequacy, strengthen 
supervisory powers and enhance information disclosure and transparency. Indeed, 
improving banks’ supervisory and regulatory frameworks by complying with the 
Basel accords has been put on the agenda in almost all Asian banking markets.  
With the efforts made by governments to strengthen the banking system post-1997, 
most Asian banking sectors seem now to be healthier than a decade ago. For example, 
as shown in Figure 4, the average capital adequacy ratio (CAR) exceeded 9% of total 
assets in the majority of Asian economies, and the non-performing loans (NPL) ratio 
                                                 
2 The HHI index is computed as the sum of the squares of the asset shares of banks in each country.  
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saw a steady decline from nearly 18% to less than 3% over the period. In addition,  
Asian banking markets saw a continuous growth of return on assets (ROA) and a fall 
of cost to income ratios (CIR), suggesting banks managed to grow over time by 
improving operational inefficiency.  
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
In recent years also Asian banks suffered from the global financial crisis of 2007-
2009, although the overall effect has been limited. This reflects, to a certain extent, 
the lessons learned from the Asian financial crisis of 1997, and more importantly, the 
subsequent efforts in strengthening the prudential regulations of the banking system. 
Even if the Asian banking markets appear to have been resilient to the recent financial 
crisis, many uncertainties remain about the long term developments. The key concern 
is how to achieve a sustainable development by striking a balance between bank 
deregulation and re-regulation. The review of historical reforms and the exploration of 
how these reforms affect banks competitive conduct, soundness and efficiency may 
have important policy implications; these could help policy makers upgrade their 
prudential and supervisory frameworks, especially for those countries that are still 
undergoing a period of transformation. 
3. Literature review 
Financial deregulation (or liberalisation) refers to the implementation of policies that 
reduce the restrictions imposed on banks, such as the lifting of restrictions on banks 
entry, on permissible activities, and on interest rates. The primary aim of deregulation 
policies is to foster competition and improve the efficiency of financial intermediaries. 
However, the ultimate effects of liberalisation on the financial sector are controversial.   
In an early study, Bauer et al. (1993) find the average annual growth rates for  US 
banks during the period between 1977 and 1988 to be negative or close to zero. They 
attribute the poor performance of US banks to financial deregulation as it raised 
banks' cost of funding and increased competition from non-bank financial 
intermediaries. This view is supported by other studies which also document poor 
performance and little efficiency improvements during the post-deregulatory period in 
the US (Grabowski et al., 1993; Elyasiani and Mahdian, 1995; Humphrey and Pulley, 
1997; Berger and Mester, 2001). 
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In contrast, studies focusing on Europe tend to show that deregulatory policies 
positively impacted on bank efficiency (see, for example, Berg 1992; Zaim, 1995; 
Hasan and Marton, 2003). More recent cross-country studies investigating the Central 
and Eastern European banking industries during the period 1998-2003, also document 
a productivity improvement along with the progress of institutional and structural 
reforms (Koutsomanoli et al., 2009). 
A positive relationship between banking reforms and efficiency is also found in 
studies focusing on the Asian banking market. Gilbert and Wilson (1998) measure the 
productivity change of Korean banks during the deregulation and privatisation period 
(1980s and early 1990s). They find that Korean banks dramatically altered their input 
and output mix which led to productivity growth. The authors attribute this 
productivity growth to the responses of local banks to the deregulation and 
privatisation policies implemented over the period. Similarly, Leightner and Lovell 
(1998) find high productivity growth in the Thai banking market between 1990 and 
1994 and attribute the result to financial liberalisation. Chen et al. (2005) examine the 
impact of China’s financial deregulation in the mid-1990s; their results show that 
deregulation led to the improvement of cost efficiency. Looking at India, Kumbhakar 
and Sarkar (2003) find no growth in banks’ total factor productivity (TFP) following 
financial liberalisation in the early 1990s, and attribute this result to the very dominant 
position of public sector banks and the fact that these did not respond to deregulation 
policies. Extending the period of observation to 1992-2009 Casu et al. (2013) find 
instead that Indian banks enjoyed positive sustained growth in TFP, mainly led by 
technical progress and by the increasingly dominant position of foreign banks.  
Overall, the empirical evidence on the effect of deregulatory policies on bank 
productivity growth and efficiency is inconclusive. This outcome may relate to the 
fact that deregulation relates to many different policy initiatives that can impact on 
bank performance in different ways. However, the existing literature tends to treat 
deregulation as one policy, instead of considering its multi-faceted nature. In addition, 
deregulation is a continuous process, and the existing literature may not sufficiently 
capture these dynamics. These issues may explain the contradictory findings and may 
hamper policy inference. 
In addition to the fact that liberalisation happens over time and through different 
policy initiatives, another complication results from the fact that often governments 
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attempt to pre-empt the potential negative effects of deregulation by implementing 
policies which aim to strengthen the regulatory framework and the resilience of 
financial institutions. Prudential regulation (also known as re-regulation) refers to the 
enforcement of a mixture of supervisory policies that aim to monitor banks’ activities 
and restrictive policies that aim to protect the banking sector from excessive risk-
taking. Over the decades, the instruments of prudential re-regulation have evolved in a 
number of ways. Firstly, given the increasing complexity of the banking business, the 
objective of official supervision shifted from monitoring banks’ activities to fostering 
banks’ internal management. Secondly, capital norms tightened over time. Thirdly, 
private monitoring that relies on market mechanisms to discipline banks’ activities 
became a key tool of the supervisory system. These elements constitute the three 
pillars of international banking practices on capital adequacy and regulation (known 
as the Basel accords).  
Theoretical arguments suggest that the instruments of prudential regulation may have 
opposite effects on bank performance. Let's consider the three pillars of capital 
regulation: (i) minimum capital requirements; (ii) supervisory review and (iii) market 
discipline.  
 
As we discussed earlier, higher capital may lower banks’ cost of borrowing as banks 
are perceived as safer and less likely to fail. However, the imposition of higher capital 
ratios might burden banks with unnecessary costs. In particular, if banks are forced to 
raise equity capital at a price higher than the interest rate on deposits, an increase in 
capital requirements may discourage bank lending (Thakor, 1996, Gorton and Winton, 
2000).  
Official supervision may reduce market failures by monitoring banks and improving 
the quality of bank lending (Beck et al., 2006). Powerful supervisors, however, may 
abuse their powers to benefit their associates and extract bribes (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1998; and Quintyn and Taylor, 2002) with detrimental effects on bank intermediation.  
Finally, the success of market discipline is conditional on two premises: 1) investors 
must be able to identify banks' financial conditions in a timely and accurate manner; 2) 
investors’ reactions to a change in the financial conditions of a bank must influence 
the behaviour of other banks (Bliss and Flannery, 2002). Given the complexity and 
opacity of the banking sector, the effective implementation of private monitoring is 
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difficult even in developed economies. For this reason, a reliance on private 
monitoring may lead to the exploitation of depositors and poor bank performance.  
One of the earlier works investigating the regulation-efficiency relationship is that of 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2003). The authors assess the effects of bank regulations, 
market structure and national institutions on the cost of intermediation (measured as 
bank net interest margin and overhead expenditure). The regulatory environment is 
captured by variables on bank entry, reserve requirements, activity restrictions and an 
overall index of bank freedom. Using a sample of 72 countries over the period 1995-
1999, they find that tightening regulations on bank entry, bank activities, reserve 
requirements and bank freedom increases the cost of intermediation, but the role of 
these regulatory variables becomes insignificant when controlling for economic 
freedom or property rights protection. These results support the view that bank 
regulations cannot be viewed independently. Barth et al. (2004) provide an insight on 
the association between re-regulatory policies and bank development, performance 
and stability. The authors find that tightening activity restrictions lowers banks’ 
efficiency, a result consistent with the findings of Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2003). In 
addition, the authors show that policies that enforce accurate information disclosure 
and private monitoring work best to enhance bank efficiency, whereas they find no 
statistically significant evidence that capital requirements and official supervisory 
power improve bank performance.  
Following the above two seminal papers a voluminous literature supports the view 
that private monitoring contributes to the improvement of bank efficiency (e.g., 
Pasiouras et al., 2009; Haw et al., 2010; Delis et al., 2011), while only limited 
evidence supports the view that official supervisory oversight and capital 
requirements help improve financial intermediation (Pasiouras et al., 2009). In 
particular, Chortareas et al. (2012) find that all interventionist supervisory and 
regulatory policies, such as capital restrictions, official supervision and private 
monitoring, hamper the efficient operation of banks. These results raise a cautionary 
flag as to the efficacy of capital requirements and bank supervision on bank 
performance.  
Despite the growing literature, there is still a paucity of studies investigating the 
above issues with reference to the Asian banking markets. Thangavelu and Findlay 
(2012) examine the impact of bank off-balance sheet activities, foreign penetration, 
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bank regulation and supervision on the efficiency of six South-east Asian banking 
markets between 1994 and 2008. They find that official supervision helps improve 
banks’ efficiency but that private monitoring actually decreases it. Zhao et al. (2008, 
2010) and Casu et al. (2013) identify a sustained productivity growth in India 
following the prudential re-regulation period (post-1998 onward), but the authors do 
not identify which re-regulatory policy contributed to the observed productive growth.  
Banker et al. (2010) investigated the post-1997 regulatory changes in Korea and 
found that policies aimed at strengthening banks’ capital structures and risk 
management do not have a uniform impact on bank productivity, but rather favour 
strategically privileged banks. The evidence from the Asian banking market seems to 
show that supervisory oversight works better than private monitoring, possibly 
because it is more difficult for emerging economies to move towards a disclosure 
strategy, given that information asymmetry problems are more acute in those 
countries.  
This study aims to fill these gaps in the literature by providing insights on the impact 
of each regulatory instrument on bank cost efficiency. In particular, this study 
estimates whether cost efficiency improved in Asian banking markets after the 1997 
crisis. Furthermore it specifically assesses the impact of different deregulation and re-
regulation policies on bank cost efficiency. 
4.  Methodology, data, variables and descriptive 
statistics 
4.1 Methodology  
The stochastic frontier approach is used to model banks’ cost characteristics. The 
general stochastic cost frontier in a panel data setting is given as:  
𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡 = TC(𝑄𝑖𝑡, 𝑤𝑖𝑡) + vit + uit                              (4.1) 
where TC is observed total cost; 𝑄 and w correspond to vectors of outputs and input 
prices respectively; 𝑣 is a symmetric random noise term, and 𝑢 is a non-negative term 
representing firm-level inefficiency. The subscripts i and t denote the i-th firm and the 
t-th period respectively. Following Battese and Coelli (1995), firm-level inefficiency 
can be explained by a series of covariates such as bank characteristics or other 
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exogenous factors. This is done by modelling the inefficiency term, 𝑢𝑖𝑡, as a function 
of the composite factors 𝑦𝑖𝑡, as follows:  
uit = 𝑦itδ + 𝜂𝑖𝑡,                                                    (4.2) 
Equations (4.1) and (4.2) are estimated simultaneously in one stage, thus overcoming 
the econometric problems associated with two-stage approaches (Kumbhakar and 
Lovell, 2003; Greene, 2005).  
 
Many researchers have noticed that the assumption of a common (“pooled”) frontier 
in a cross-country scenario is quite unwarranted given the differences in banking 
environments and the level and quality of services associated with bank 
intermediation (Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000, 
Chaffai et al., 2001; Bikker, 2002). If banking technology across countries is not 
homogeneous the estimation of a pooled frontier will produce biased results. As a 
solution, Battese and Rao (2002) and Battese et al. (2004) propose a meta-frontier 
model: this involves defining an overarching mathematical function to envelope the 
deterministic components of the country-specific stochastic frontiers. The functional 
form of the metafrontier is the same as that of the stochastic frontiers that it envelops, 
and the coefficients are estimated by linear programming. The intuition behind the 
metafrontier is that technological spillovers do exist so that all countries have 
theoretical access to a superior technology (the meta-technology), regardless of 
whether they actually make use of it or not. This approach thus allows for the 
identification of comparable efficiency scores for the banks of different countries. The 
distance of each bank from the metafrontier defines its metaefficiency score (Meta-E) 
and it is made up of two components, as shown in Equation (4.3):  the technology gap 
ratio (TGR) and the bank’s efficiency score relative to its country-specific frontier 
(CF-E):  
Meta-Eit = CF-Eit ∗ TGRit                                              (4.3)  
 
The TGR measures the distance between a country frontier and the metafrontier, so in 
essence the extent to which the technology of a country lags behind the meta-
technology. The TGR scores are bound between 0 and 1, with values closer to 1 
indicating a closer proximity to the meta-technology and viceversa. The CF-E 
measures the distance of a bank from its country specific frontier and it too is bound  
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between 0 and 1; as a result then the Meta-E score is bound between 0 and 1 too, as 
can be easily seen from Equation (4.3). 
 
The meta-frontier model is a non-stochastic approach, which means no distribution is 
associated to the estimators thus ruling out the testing of hypotheses.  One way to get 
around this problem is through bootstrapping (Efron, 1981, Efron and Tibshirani, 
1986). Bootstrapping is a computationally intensive, non-parametric approach for 
making statistical inference when traditional parametric inference is unavailable 
(Mooney and Duval, 1992). It involves continuously resampling with replacement 
from the original sample data so as to derive an empirical estimator of the sampling 
distribution of a statistic. We will use the bootstrapping approach to derive confidence 
intervals and test statistics for the estimated coefficients of the meta-frontier. 
  
4.2 Data 
We collected data from different sources to construct a panel database containing 
bank-level data and country level data from eight Asian economies (China, India, 
Japan, Hong Kong, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines) over the 
period 2001-2010. The sample includes all types of depository institutions 
(commercial banks, saving banks and cooperatives) except for cooperative banks 
from Japan3, which results in a total of 3805 observations. Financial information is 
obtained from Bankscope. Data on regulatory variables is obtained from the World 
Bank survey database (Barth et al., 2001, 2006, 2007) and the Economic Freedom 
Index of the Heritage Foundation.  
We conduct the analysis at the bank level. Following an established banking literature, 
we specify a translog stochastic cost function 4 , where the dependent variable is 
measured by bank total costs (TC). In the specification of the inputs and outputs, we 
follow the intermediation approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977) and specify input 
                                                 
3 The exclusion of the cooperative banks of Japan from our sample is primarily due to the following 
consideration. There are more than 400 cooperative banks in Japan and they are small, locally based, 
and considered as “not-for-profit” organisations (Liu and Wilson, 2010). Kano and Tsutsui (2003) find 
that loan markets for cooperative banks in Japan are segmented by prefecture, implying that they do not 
compete on the same platform as the regional and national players. We therefore exclude Japanese 
cooperative banks from our sample. 
4 For the construction of a translog cost function see Ray (1982). For the application of the function in 
the banking literature see Mester (1996) and Altunbas and Molyneux (1996), among others.  
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prices (w) as price of labour (PL), price of physical capital (PC), and price of funds 
(PF), respectively; outputs (Q) are defined as net loans (LN), other earning assets 
(OEA), and net fees and commissions (NFC). We also incorporate risk factors (X), 
proxied by the capital ratio (CR), the volatility of returns on assets (VOroa) and loan 
loss provisions (LLP). In line with the aims of the analysis, we include a deregulation 
indicator (Dereg) and a re-regulation indicator (Rereg), measuring the extent to which 
the banking market of a country is liberalised and the strength of prudential 
regulations respectively. A quadratic time trend (T and T2) and the annual GDP 
growth (GDP-growth) are included in the cost frontier to capture technological 
progress over time and to control for the macroeconomic environment.  Next, we 
model the determinants of inefficiency of Equation (4.3), and we include indices of 
activity restrictions (ACTR) and credit market deregulation (CMD) and indices that 
reflect the strength of capital stringency policy (CAPS), supervision power (SUPP) 
and market discipline (MARD). All regulatory indices are scaled by the maximum 
value in each group to ensure that regulatory variables are bound between 0 and 1 and 
take an equal weight in the estimation. We also include ownership dummies (D-State, 
D-Private, D-For, D-Coop) and control for the degree of market concentration (HHI). 
Table 2 summarises the definitions of the variables. 
Table 2 Variables specification 
Variable Specification 
Dependent variable 
TC Total Cost (TC) = Interest Expenses + Operating Expenses 
Determinants of the cost frontier 
Input prices (w) 
PL (w1) Price of Labour = Personnel Expenses /Total Assets 
PC (w2) Price of Capital = (Other Operating Expenses + Loan and other Impaired 
changes) / Total Assets 
PF (w3) Price of Funds = Interest Expenses/ (Total Deposits+ Money Market and 
Short-term funding +Other Funding+ Long-term Funding) 
Outputs (Q) 
LN (Q1) Net Loans = Gross Loans – Reserves for Impaired Loans 
OEA (Q2) Other Earning Assets  
NFC (Q3) Net Fees and Commissions  
Risk factors (X) 
CR (X1) Equity Capital Ratio = (Equity Capitals+ Reserves) /(Total Loans) 
VOroa (X2) Volatility of ROA = Standard Deviation of Return on Assets 
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LLR (X3) Loan Loss Provision = Reserved for Impaired Loans/Total Loans  
Control variables 
GDP-
growth 
Annual GDP Growth Rate 
Regulatory variables 
Dereg Deregulation indicator, the mean values of ACTR and CMD. 
Rereg Re-regulation indicator, the mean values of CAPS, SUPP and MARD. 
Determinants of inefficiency  
- Regulatory variables  
ACTR  Activities restrictions: an index measuring the degree to which authorities 
allow banks to engage in fee-based activities, and the degree of regulatory 
restrictiveness on the mixing of banking and commerce. The degree of 
restrictiveness for each activity is quantified on a scale from 1 to 4, 
corresponding to ‘prohibited’ ‘restricted’, ‘permitted’, and ‘unrestricted’.  The 
index is the average of the scale of the activities; higher values indicate fewer 
restrictions on banking activities.  
CMD  Capital market deregulation: an index reflecting the degree to which a 
banking market is liberalised. The index includes information from 4 
categories: the ownership of banks, foreign bank competition, private sector 
credit and interest rate controls. Each category is assigned values between 0 
to10. The index is the average of the values of each category. Higher values 
indicate a more liberalised banking system. 
CAPS  Capital stringency: index based on the answers to the survey questions 
regarding the overall capital stringency. The values assigned to the index range 
from 0 to 7, with higher values indicating greater capital stringency. 
SUPP  Supervision power: the index measures whether supervisory authorities can 
take specific actions to prevent and correct problems. A value of 1 is assigned 
to a ‘yes’ answer and a value of 0 to a ‘no’ answer. This variable is the sum of 
these assigned values which range from 0 to 15, with higher values indicating 
greater supervisory power. 
MARD  Market discipline: the index captures the degree to which accurate 
information is disclosed to the public. The values assigned to the index range 
from 0 to 7, with higher values indicating more transparency and hence greater 
private supervisory power. 
- Ownership dummies  
D-State  1 if banks are ultimately owned by the state, 0 otherwise; 
D-Private  1 if banks are identified as private banks and ultimately owned by domestic 
private sector, 0 otherwise; 
D-For  1 if banks are ultimately owned by foreign organisations or other parties, 0 
otherwise;  
D-Coop  1 if banks are credit cooperatives, or rural banks, 0 otherwise. 
- Market structure indicator 
HHI The Herfindahl - Hirschman Index. Values range from 0 to 1, with higher 
values indicating greater market concentration.  
Note: The definition of CMD is based on the database of the Economic Freedom Index; other 
regulatory variables are based on Barth et al. (2001).  
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Table 3 summarises the variables by country. As can be seen, the average size of 
banks in Japan, China and Hong Kong is substantially larger than in other counties in 
the sample. Banks in Japan, China and Hong Kong also have lower input prices 
relative to their neighbouring countries. In addition, countries which were most 
affected by the Asian crisis tend to have higher capital ratios, larger return volatilities 
and higher LLP (columns 9-11). In terms of the degree of liberalisation, Hong Kong 
and the Philippines are highly liberalised while China, Indonesia and India lag behind 
the regional average (columns 12-14). As to the strength of prudential regulations, 
China has the least stringent capital requirements and India the highest (27.5% and 
83.3% respectively, column 15). Both countries grant less power to official 
supervision (column 16). China however, places greater effort on information 
disclosure to foster market discipline (column 17). Overall, Japan, Hong Kong and the 
Philippines implement relatively austere prudential and supervisory frameworks 
(column 18). Turning to ownership structure, state ownership still plays a 
predominant role in the banking markets in China, India and Indonesia. Finally, the 
banking market is highly concentrated in Hong Kong but fragmented in Japan and 
India.  
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Table 3 Sample descriptive statistics  
  
Cou
ntry 
Dep. 
vars 
Outputs (Qs) Input prices (ws)  
Ma
cro-
con.
itio
n 
Risk factor (Xs)  
Deregulation 
indicators 
Re-regulation indicators Ownership dummies 
Conc
entrat
ion 
TC LN OEA NFC 
PL 
(%) 
PC 
(%) 
PF 
(%) 
GDP 
grow
th 
(%) 
CR 
(%) 
VO  
(roa) 
(%) 
LLP 
(%) 
CM
D 
AC
TR 
Dere
g 
CAP
S 
SUP
P 
MA
RD 
Rere
g 
D_S
tate 
(%) 
D_Pr
ivate 
(%) 
D_F
or 
(%) 
D_C
oop 
(%) 
HHI 
(%) 
Col. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) 
HK 844 13,382 15,952 330 0.60 0.67 1.64 4.0 11.9 0.3 1.0 97.3 97.1 97.3 75.9 78.6 85.7 89.8 0.00 20.4 79.6 0.00 25.9 
JP 968 33,996 23,025 239 0.37 0.83 0.47 0.7 6.4 0.4 1.6 86.8 63.2 80.2 66.7 92.9 68.5 90.8 0.00 100 0.00 0.00 7.22 
CN 1,539 27,507 22,018 219 0.52 0.87 1.59 10.9 8.4 0.3 2.6 68.8 42.5 61.5 27.5 76.1 89.9 77.5 67.9 29.4 1.18 1.49 12.9 
IN 927 7,433 4,427 170 1.04 1.44 5.15 7.4 11.4 0.2 1.8 70.8 60.4 67.9 83.3 75.8 42.9 77.5 73.8 20.9 4.47 0.82 7.2 
ID 250 1,224 1,181 37 1.46 2.35 6.10 5.2 17.5 0.9 6.1 76.2 47.2 68.1 50.0 96.4 57.1 85.4 51.0 18.3 30.6 0.00 10.4 
MY 434 6,252 2,405 105 0.73 1.26 2.42 4.5 14.3 0.5 4.2 80.6 62.2 75.5 49.6 93.5 64.4 85.7 22.9 54.6 22.5 0.00 9.6 
PH 145 998 970 40 1.17 2.47 3.20 4.8 19.7 0.5 7.4 90.7 83.3 88.6 80.6 92.9 57.1 91.0 8.29 90.4 1.25 0.02 9.2 
TH 540 8,223 3,424 113 0.77 1.79 1.94 4.3 12.0 0.9 6.1 87.0 55.2 78.1 59.0 76.4 64.8 78.2 35.0 60.0 4.99 0.00 10.6 
Notes: a) The cost and outputs (in columns 1-4) are the arithmetic average of each country and are expressed as per 1,000,000 USD. The amount is deflated using 2005 as 
base year.   
b) Input prices and ownership variables are expressed as asset-weighted averages.   
c) Dereg (Column 14) is the average of columns 12-13, and Rereg (column 18) is the average of columns 15-17.  
d) All regulatory variables are scaled by the maximum values of each group to ensure the regulatory variables are bound between 0 and 1 and therefore carry an equal weight 
in the estimation. 
e) Countries’ names are shortened as follows: CN for China, HK for Hong Kong SAR, JP for Japan, IN for India, ID for Indonesia, MY for Malaysia, PH for the Philippines, 
TH for Thailand, VN for Vietnam. These abbreviations apply to the whole Chapter.  
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5.  Empirical results 
As a starting point, a likelihood-ratio (LR) test is conducted to test the null hypothesis 
of technological homogeneity in the sample. We strongly reject the null hypothesis 
(with a p-value of 0.000) and conclude that banks from different countries indeed 
operate under different technologies, which justifies the use of the meta-frontier 
approach.  
In what follows, we first discuss the estimation of the country-specific frontiers and 
the determinants of bank cost inefficiency. We then look at the results of the 
estimation of the meta-frontier and discuss the dynamics of banks meta-cost 
efficiency scores.  
 
5.1 Country stochastic frontiers 
The results of the country-specific estimations abide with the microeconomic theory 
requirements of a cost frontier5, with positive and significant inputs and outputs cost 
elasticities. Technical progress, measured by the quadratic time trend, is mainly non-
significant, with the only exception of Hong Kong. Efficiency levels are reasonably 
high in each country and do not show significant changes over time (this is shown in 
Figure 5 later on). Looking at the determinants of inefficiency (the y variables of 
Equation (4.3)) the results show that the relaxation of activities restriction (ACTR) 
does not have a uniform impact on banks’ cost efficiency. Capital market deregulation 
(CMD) that liberalises interest rates, enhances private and foreign penetration and 
facilitates credit allocation positively impacts cost efficiency. The findings suggest 
that deregulation can improve banks’ cost performance but the overall effects of 
liberalisation policies appear to be multi-faceted and should be considered 
individually.   
Turning to the re-regulation indicators, capital policies (CAPS) have a negative impact 
on banks’ efficiency, possibly because higher capital requirements increase banks’ 
costs. We find no convincing evidence that official supervision (SUPP) and market 
discipline (MARD) improve banks’ efficiency, possibly because government 
intervention may intensify agency conflicts which in turn can hinder the progress of 
                                                 
5 For reasons of space the results of the estimation of the country-specific frontiers are not reported but 
they are available upon request. 
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cost efficiency. It is also necessary to point out that many Asian economies are 
characterised by the absence experienced regulators, poor quality on-site supervision 
and poor law enforcement. These institutional weaknesses may undermine the quality 
and effectiveness of official supervision. Finally, it may be more difficult for 
transitional economies to move towards a disclosure-based supervisory regime given 
the opacity of the banking system. Policy makers who are trying to upgrade their 
regulatory framework should take into account the potential negative impact of 
current re-regulatory instruments on bank efficiency. 
 
5.2 The estimation of the meta-frontier 
Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients of the meta-frontier. The confidence 
intervals and standard errors derived from bootstrapping are also reported in the table. 
It is noticeable that the vast majority of the bootstrapped standard errors are relatively 
small, indicating that the coefficients are precisely estimated and hence representative 
of the meta-cost frontier.  
Focusing on the impact of regulatory variables on meta-cost technology, the results 
show that financial deregulation (Dereg) that removes restrictions on banks’ activities, 
liberalises interest rates, or enhances foreign penetration, positively impacts on the 
meta-cost technology. For instance, if the deregulation indices were to increase by 0.1 
units, this would induce a reduction of cost by 5.57% (holding other factors constant). 
These findings seem to support ongoing policies aimed at further liberalising banking 
systems. However, banking re-regulation (Rereg) seems to adversely shift banks’ cost 
technology, possibly because conforming to a more rigorous prudential regulatory 
system raises banks’ costs. But the effect is relatively mild and statistically 
insignificant, so we remain cautious in interpreting this outcome. 
The quadratic time trend (T and T2) exhibits a concave pattern with the inflection 
point occurring after almost 9 of the 10 years of the sample, thus indicating a regress 
of cost technologies in 2001-2009. The finding is consistent with Sun and Chang 
(2011) who also detected a regress of cost technology in banks’ operations in their 
analysis of bank risk and cost efficiency of eight emerging markets in Asia. The 
outcome may relate to the fact that banks had to increase their efforts to clean up non-
performing assets on their balance sheets after the 1997 crisis. In addition, extra 
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resources spent on risk control, new business initiatives and technological innovation 
might have contributed to this pattern of cost technology.  
Estimates of bank risk factors indicate higher capital ratios (CR) are not associated 
with greater costs. We interpret this as a signalling effect, that is, a well-capitalised 
bank may signal higher retained earnings and greater cost savings. Returns volatility 
(VOroa) is associated with lower bank costs. The result is in line with Isik and Hassan 
(2002) and Havrylchyk (2006). The level of loan loss provisions (LLP), however, has 
no significant effect on bank cost.   
 
 Table 4 Parameter estimations of meta-frontier 
Variable Coef   Std-Err T-ratio 95% Conf. Interval 
LnTC 
      
Constant -0.4926 
 
0.6050 -0.8142 -1.8325 0.4541 
Ln(LN) 0.4937 *** 0.1906 2.5901 0.2296 0.8966 
ln(OEA) 0.8039 *** 0.1981 4.0572 0.4231 1.1383 
Ln(NFC) -0.0371 
 
0.0326 -1.1384 -0.1110 0.0205 
0.5[ln(LN)]2 0.1204 *** 0.0302 3.9813 0.0593 0.1767 
Ln(LN)*ln(OEA) -0.1062 *** 0.0395 -2.6885 -0.1893 -0.0495 
Ln(LN)*ln(NFC) -0.0097 * 0.0057 -1.6983 -0.0150 0.0078 
0.5(lnOEA)2 0.0695 
 
0.0503 1.3802 0.0224 0.1816 
Ln(OEA)*ln(NFC) 0.0126 ** 0.0057 2.2045 -0.0038 0.0186 
0.5(lnNFC)2 0.0007 
 
0.0015 0.4639 -0.0022 0.0035 
Z2 0.0515 
 
0.1267 0.4067 -0.1604 0.3258 
Z3 0.3833 *** 0.1027 3.7330 0.1570 0.5578 
Z12 0.0705 *** 0.0169 4.1721 0.0149 0.0826 
Z13 -0.0588 *** 0.0139 -4.2282 -0.0880 -0.0320 
Z23 -0.0930 *** 0.0115 -8.0963 -0.1061 -0.0607 
Ln(LN)*Z2 -0.0083 
 
0.0269 -0.3088 -0.0305 0.0683 
Ln(LN)*Z3 -0.0364 *** 0.0144 -2.5358 -0.0449 0.0081 
Ln(OEA)*Z2 0.0380 
 
0.0309 1.2312 -0.0536 0.0597 
Ln(OEA)*Z3 0.0346 ** 0.0150 2.3109 -0.0098 0.0459 
Ln(NFC)*Z2 -0.0075 
 
0.0061 -1.2398 -0.0149 0.0087 
Ln(NFC)*Z3 -0.0020 
 
0.0020 -0.9947 -0.0056 0.0023 
GDP_growth -0.0054 ** 0.0027 -1.9703 -0.0070 0.0042 
T 0.0952 *** 0.0185 5.1532 0.0288 0.1049 
T2 -0.0053 *** 0.0013 -4.2074 -0.0069 -0.0017 
Ln(CR) -0.0373 *** 0.0086 -4.3110 -0.0556 -0.0208 
Ln[VO(roa)] -0.0171 ** 0.0069 -2.4692 -0.0331 -0.0063 
Ln(LLP) -0.0003 
 
0.0013 -0.2356 -0.0034 0.0016 
Dereg -0.5573 *** 0.0216 -3.9921 -0.1281 -0.0384 
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Rereg 0.0088 
 
0.0173 0.0631 -0.0045 0.0633 
       
Obs 3805           
Note: (a) Homogeneity in input prices is imposed, the cost function is therefore estimated in its 
transformational form, where, Z2=lnPC-lnPL, Z3=lnPF-lnPL, Z12=lnPL*lnPC-0.5(lnPL)2-0.5(lnPC)2, 
Z13=lnPL*lnPF-0.5(lnPL)2-0.5(lnPF)2, Z23=lnPC*lnPF-0.5(lnPC)2-0.5(lnPF)2.  
 
5.3 The evolution of meta-cost efficiency 
Based on the estimation of the metafrontier, we can easily obtain the estimations of 
meta-cost efficiency scores for individual banks. To see how meta-cost efficiency 
evolved over time, in Figure 5 we plot the changes in the industry average meta-cost 
efficiency scores (Meta-E), technology gap ratios (TGR) and efficiency scores 
benchmarked by country frontiers (CF-E).  
The figure shows that Asian banking markets experienced considerable improvements 
in meta-cost efficiency over the 2000s, except for Malaysia. These improvements 
suggest that bank deregulatory polices, such as the liberalisation of interest rates and 
the relaxation of foreign bank entry, have transformed the financial landscape as they 
seem to have fostered reductions in managerial slack and allocative inefficiency. 
Moreover, when decomposing the meta-cost efficiency into its components, we find 
that while CF-E scores remain roughly unchanged over time, TGRs improve 
considerably. These results seem to suggest that the improvement in meta-efficiency 
is primarily driven by the advances of domestic technologies towards regional best 
practices (measured by the TGRs). The findings also suggest that domestic banks have 
equipped themselves with better technology to embrace international competition.  
In terms of differentials of cost performance between countries, the Japanese banking 
market is the most cost efficient. We tentatively explain this result as the outcome of 
the banking reforms (the so-called ‘Financial Big Bang’) implemented in Japan in the 
late 1990s, which aimed to foster a market-based mechanism and thereby to increase 
banks’ incentives for cost-saving. In addition, some banking innovation (such as the 
IT revolution) implemented in Japan in the early 2000s, aimed at providing high-
quality services at lower costs also contributed to the efficient outcome of Japanese 
banks. In contrast, the Malaysian banking market is relatively cost inefficient and 
experienced little progress of cost performance over time. This poor performance can 
be ascribed to Malaysia’s high market concentration and to its increasingly stringent 
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capital norms. In addition, prudential policies (such as restrictions on foreign bank 
entry and branching) imposed in Malaysia over the past decade may also have 
hampered banks' incentives for cost reduction.   
 
[Insert Figure 5 about here] 
 
6. Conclusions 
This study examined the impact of the coexistence of bank deregulation and 
prudential re-regulation on banks’ cost characteristics in eight major Asian economies 
over the period 2001-2010. As a first step, this Chapter explored the impact of bank 
regulation and market structure on cost efficiency by estimating country-specific 
frontiers. We then examined the factors that affect the meta-cost technology. We find 
that financial deregulation that liberalises bank’s interest rates, removes activities 
restrictions and enhances foreign penetration, positively impacts on cost technology. 
This finding underscores the importance of further liberalising banking systems in 
Asia. Bank re-regulation does not seem to have a significant impact on banks’ cost 
technology. However, given the relatively short time period since the implementation 
of re-regulatory policies, the long-term effects are still uncertain. Overall, meta cost 
technology in Asia has regressed over the period 2001-2009. This may relate to the 
fact that banks had to increase their efforts to clean up their balance sheets after the 
1997 crisis. Additional resources spent on risk control, new business initiatives and 
technological innovation may also have contributed to this results.  
We also find that banks’ meta-cost efficiency improved considerably overtime in 
most Asian economies except for Malaysia. This improvement is closely related to the 
progress of domestic technology towards the ‘super-national’ technology represented 
by the meta-frontier. The analysis suggests domestic banks have equipped themselves 
with better technology to embrace international competition. Overall, the coexistence 
of deregulatory and re-regulatory frameworks observed in Asia appears to be 
beneficial for banks’ cost performance, given the significant improvement of bank 
cost efficiency observed in the past decade. However, there are signs of a slowing 
down of such performance in recent years, which may be associated with the 
increasing emphasis on bank prudential re-regulation. These results highlight the 
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importance of combining policies which aim to foster financial stability with policies 
which promote financial intermediation.  
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Figure 1 Bank ownership structure in selected Asian economies 
 
Data sources: country data from Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey (BRSS), Round I-IV, 
released by the World Bank in 2001, 2003, 2007 and 20126.  HK and VN’s data are compiled by the 
authors. 
  
                                                 
6  Note the four-round data capture the information corresponding to the period 1998-99, 2001, 2005, 
2008-2010, respectively.  
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Figure 2 Market concentration indicators  
 
 
Sources: Bank Supervision and Regulation Survey (the World Bank, 2001, 2007, 2012); Bankscope 
database. 
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Figure 3 Net interest margin (NIM) by country  
 
Note: Net interest margin computed as a share of its interest-bearing (total earning) assets.  
Source: Financial Development and Structure Dataset (The World Bank, 2013). 
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Figure 4 Indicators of banking system performance 
  
  
Notes: (a) Vietnam’s data are not available for Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) and Non-performing 
Loans (NPLs). (b) CAR is computed as total capital as a percentage of total assets.  
Data source: Financial Development and Structure Dataset (The World Bank, 2012, 2013).  
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Figure 5  Decomposition of meta-cost efficiency scores. 
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